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Introduction
The recent Financial Crisis has revealed substantial deficiencies in the regulation and supervision of the international Banking Sector. Comprehensive reform packages like Basel III or the Dodd Frank Act in the United States have been established to improve the resilience of the banking sector in general but especially in times of financial or economic distress. Key measures include a substantial increase of capital requirements both in quantitative and qualitative terms and the introduction of internationally harmonised liquidity standards. Furthermore, risk management and governance processes were improved as well as transparency and disclosure of banks were strengthened.
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The problem that Financial Institutions could either be "too big to fail" or "too interconnected to fail" has been addressed by the G20 and various international organizations like the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) or the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Financial Institutions have been characterised as systemically important, if their distress or disorderly failure would cause significant disruption to the financial system and economic activity due to their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness.
3 A failure of such Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) could seriously damage the stability of the financial system due to spillover effects to other Financial Institutions, private and institutional investors as well as the real economy through multiple channels and negative externalities. SIFIs are expected to have higher loss-absorbency capacities and are subject to more intensive supervision and resolution planning in order to reduce moral hazard and to take into account the specific relevance of SIFIs for the global financial stability.
Regulatory practice currently follows indicator-based approaches that are applied to the Banking and Insurance sector to identify Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs). For instance the size of banks, their interconnectedness, the lack of readily available substitutes for services or infrastructures they provide, their global activity and their complexity are indicators used to measure the global systemic importance of banks. 4 The FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have published the most recent list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) in November 2015 that contains 30 Institutions allocated to five buckets. Each bucket represents the level of systemic importance in a descending order and determines the required level of additional common equity loss absorbency as a percentage of riskweighted assets that applies to each G-SIB. The additional capital requirements range from 3,5% (Bucket 5) to 1,0% (Bucket 1).
Furthermore, nine insurance groups have been qualified as G-SIIs as of November 2015 that are subject to higher loss absorbency (HLA) requirements and further policy measures. 6 The identification of G-SII rests also on a similar indicator-based approach with the key parameters size, interconnectedness, global activity, asset liquidation and substitutability being measured with insurance specific indicators.
7 Besides, there is a wide range of Financial Institutions outside the Banking and Insurance sector like e.g. Finance Companies, Asset Management Firms (e.g. Hedgefunds) or Market Intermediaries whose failure could equally trigger instability of the financial system. It is particularly challenging to find a common methodology for identifying such Non-Bank Non-Insurer (NBNI) Financial Institutions as globally systemically important as underlying business models, risk profiles and transmission channels are very heterogeneous. 8 Furthermore, there is a growing number of research publications that deal with financial networks to better understand interconnections between Financial Institutions and their relevance for systemic risk. However, there are still several issues to be solved, e.g. regarding data requirements and empirical testing of underlying model assumptions before they might be used in practice by regulatory authorities.
9 A precise and consistent definition of a SIFI is pivotal to ensure efficient and effective regulation by e.g. quantifying capital surcharges and avoid regulatory arbitrage between different segments of the financial services industry.
10 This paper proposes a threefold test logic that allows to classify Financial Institutions as systemically important independent of the specific industry segment.
The proposal
The methodology to identify SIFIs outlined in this proposal is based on the assumption that a SIFI is systemically important, if it has a global market relevance, a high level of risk potential and a high level of interconnectedness with other Financial Institutions. As an initial filter for selecting Financial Institutions to be tested a minimum threshold for Total Assets could be applied which implies that Financial Institutions with Total Assets below this limit would be considered too small to have a systemic impact upon failure. If we assume that a Financial Institution has to own or manage at least Total Assets of USD 200 bn, one would approximately select the Top 100 Banks, the Top 50 Insurance Firms and the Top 100 Investment Firms (together the "TOP 250") whereby some of the largest financial conglomerates would fall in all three buckets. 
A threefold "SIFI Test"
Consequently, this paper proposes a threefold indicator based "SIFI test" along the three dimensions outlined above, a Market Relevance-Test, a Risk Potential-Test and an Interconnectedness-Test. Based on this logic, a Financial Institution is categorized as a SIFI, if and when it passes the SIFI test in all three dimensions (see Figure 1) . The test should be updated on a regular basis. 
Market Relevance -Test
The rationale behind the first test is that a SIFI is supposed to have global market relevance and therefore a leading position in most of its core markets. Depending on the business model and product offering global market relevance could be either reflected by leading positions in global markets (e.g. Investment Banking) or in multiple local markets provided that the geographic footprint covers all major economic regions (Americas, EMEA, APAC). If this is the case, the conclusion that a failure would significantly affect a large customer base appears to be reasonable.
To conduct the market relevance test, market shares in each core market of the respective Financial Institution have to be measured. The test examines whether a potential SIFI has a market share above a certain "critical market share" in its defined market segments. The calibration of the respective critical market share should be subject to a detailed market concentration analysis per product line and region using e.g. a Lorenz Curve. For each market segment the cumulative market share of the Top 25% 14 with the largest market shares is calculated. The critical market share would be the marginal market share attributable to the smallest Financial Institution within the Top 25%. The respective Financial Institution would be classified as SIFI (subject to the outcome of the other two tests), if the test reveals that the market shares are equal or above the respective critical market share for either at least one product line in all major economic regions (for regional markets) or at least one global market. For instance a market leading Retail Bank that conducts business only in one core economic region, e.g. the Americas, would not be qualified as SIFI due to the lack of global market relevance. Conversely an Investment Bank with a market leading position in at least one global product line (e.g. Equities or Fixed Income Sales and Trading) would pass the Market Relevance-Test.
Risk Potential -Test
The rationale behind the second test is that the level of riskiness of the entire business activities of a SIFI has to be so high that it constitutes a substantial part of the overall risk potential associated with the worldwide largest Financial Institutions (e.g. the "Top 250"). However, Non-Bank Non-Insurance Financial Institutions like e.g. asset management firms are not yet obliged to implement Economic Capital Models. Similar to the market assessment test, global risk concentration is analysed by applying the Economic Capital concept to the "Top 250" Financial Institutions and calculating the cumulative risk share of the Top 25% with the largest risk potential as indicated by the Economic Capital. The "critical risk share" would be the marginal risk share attributable to the smallest Financial Institution within the Top 25%. If the test reveals that the risk share is equal or above the critical risk share, the respective Financial Institution would be classified as SIFI subject to the outcome of the two other tests.
Interconnectedness -Test
The rationale behind the third test is that the failure of a SIFI due to its size and interconnectedness could trigger defaults of other Financial Institutions and/or substantial losses for its shareholders or institutional and private debt holders to an extent that trust into the stability of the global financial 14 The 25% threshold is exemplary and should be calibrated depending on market concentration. Furthermore, it could make sense to set a minimum figure of e.g. 5% for the calculated critical market share to take into account highly fragmented markets. system is endangered and as a consequence could lead to disruptions in the global financial markets. A simplified approach to measure the level of interconnectedness is based on a matrix that quantifies the bilateral financial relationships among the "Top 250" Financial Institutions.
In Figure 3 
